Advanced Microeconomics: Syllabus

Instructor: Xiang Sun

Wuhan University, Economics and Management School
Academic Year 2018–2019, Semester 2

Chinese title: 高级微观经济学

Prerequisite: Calculus, Probability, Intermediate Microeconomics, Basic Game Theory

Course description: In this course, we mainly talk about the information economics and mechanism design.

Modular credit: 1.5 modular credits

Modular number:

Time: Week 12–16, Monday 18:30–20:55, Thursday 14:30–16:55

Venue: B253

Module website: http://www.xiangsun.org/teaching, for announcements, lecture notes downloading, and homework submissions.

Instructor: 孙祥

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- Mailbox: 11-13

Office hours: By email appointment

Teaching assistants: Not available

Main references:

- Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry R. Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Language:

	Lecture notes	Lectures	Homework sets	Final examination
Chinese		✓		
English	✓	✓	✓	✓

Supplementary readings:

- Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, *The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model*, Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Tilman Börgers, *An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design*.
- 陈钊, 信息与激励经济学, 格致出版社.
- 田国强, 高级微观经济学, 中国人民大学出版社.

Grading:

- Closed-book final examination: 100%

  - Date and time: June 13 (Week 17, Thursday), 08:00–13:00 (Xiang Sun's part) and 15:00–17:00 (Bo Shen's part)
  - Venue: TBA

Examination policy:

- Each student should bring the student card with clear photo ID.
- Each student can bring one A4-size two-sided hand-written helpsheet.
- No permission is ever given to a student to write the mid-term test (if any) or final examination in advance of its date.
- Cheating = 0 mark
- The student who misses the mid-term test (if any) can have the weight of the missed mid-term test (if any) shifted to the final examination, if both of the following conditions are met:

  - The student notifies the instructor via e-mail and in advance of the date and time that the mid-term test (if any) will be missed.
  - The student submits an official medical certificate to the instructor within 3 working days of final examination.

- Students who do not write the mid-term test, and fail to meet both criteria receive a 0 mark.
- There is no make-up for the mid-term test (if any) or the final examination.

Course outline:

- Part 1: Information economics
- Part 2: Mechanism design

Tentative time table:

Week	Lecture	Date	[MWG]	Topics	Remarks
12	1	May 6	13.A–B	Adverse selection	
12	2	May 9	13.C	Signaling 1	
13	3	May 13	13.C	Signaling 2	
13	4	May 16	13.D	Competitive screening	
14	5	May 20	14.C	Monopolistic screening	
14	6	May 23	14.B	Moral hazard 1	
15	7	May 27		Screening	
15	8	May 30		Bayesian mechanism design 1	
16	9	Jun. 3		Bayesian mechanism design 2	
16	10	Jun. 6		Dominant strategy mechanism design	
17		Jun. 13		Final	